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Abstract
Held in Italy shortly after the election of Silvio Berlusconi’s conservative government,
the 2001 Group of Eight summit went down in history as the battle of Genoa. From July 20th
through July 22nd, the leaders of the eight wealthiest countries in the world conducted their
debates inside Genoa’s “red zone:” a militarized citadel at the heart of this city’s downtown. In
the meantime, the surrounding “yellow zone” became the theater of a guerrilla warfare and a
police and army violence that had few antecedents in recent Italian history. As a state of
exception was established in Genoa for the duration of the summit, over a hundred police
officers and four hundred protesters were injured, more than three hundred demonstrators were
illegally apprehended (and, in some cases, tortured), and one was killed under circumstances that
were never fully clarified. This article argues that the events that took place in Genoa were
precipitated by the inscription of a political imaginary into a peculiar spatiality: a magic circle
where the suspension of normal social life, the crystallization of conservative media narratives,
and the spectacularization and militarization of political action enabled the performance of a
highly abstract, and yet devastatingly real, social drama featuring the confrontation between
righteous selves and their evil foes.

Inside the Magic Circle: Conjuring the Terrorist Enemy at the 2001 Group of
Eight Summit
The arena, the card-table, the magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, the tennis
court, the court of justice, etc, are all... forbidden spots, isolated, hedged round,
hallowed, within which special rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within the
ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart. Johan Huizinga1
Held in Italy shortly after the election of Silvio Berlusconi’s second conservative
government, the 2001 Group of Eight summit went down in history as the battle of Genoa due to
the violent clashes and the extreme brutality of state repression. From July 20th through July 22nd,
the leaders of the eight wealthiest countries in the world conducted their debates inside a
militarized citadel—a magic circle--at the heart of downtown Genoa. In the meantime, the rest of
the city became the theater of a guerrilla warfare and a police and army violence that had few
antecedents in recent Italian history. While most protesters sought to hold their demonstrations
peacefully, Black Bloc anarchists carried out hit-and-run attacks on the police as well as on
civilian targets, ravaging and burning down parked cars, banks, and small businesses. Instead of
seeking to contain the Black Bloc’s offensive, police and army corps responded by
indiscriminately beating all of the protesters who happened to be in their way. Over three
hundred of them were illegally detained; more than four hundred had to be hospitalized, and one
young man, Carlo Giuliani, was shot in the head.
The end of the violence coincided with the conclusion of the summit on July 21. By July
22, most protesters had left town; over the next several weeks, the devastated city slowly
returned to a disconcerted normalcy. As cleaning crews moved in to pick up the burnt rubble and
business owners began replacing their shattered shop windows, astonished local and global
publics who had followed the events from afar wondered what on earth had happened in Genoa.
1

Instigated by the media apparatus owned by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Italian
conservatives blamed the social movements; progressives, instead, pointed the finger at the
Fascist undercurrents in Italy’s newly elected government.
Even as Italian political factions kept accusing each other, myriad reports on the events
materialized not just in newspapers and television broadcasts all over the world, but also on the
Internet. In a matter of weeks, countless sites documenting the battle of Genoa made their
appearance on the web, while books and videos on the same topic piled up on the shelves of
Italian bookstores. Drawing on such testimonials as well as on ethnographic interviews, this
article is yet another attempt to make sense of the battle of Genoa.2 Rather than compiling an
investigative report, however, in what follows I use the tools of anthropological, sociological,
and geographic theory to examine the narrative and spatial dynamics that contributed to the
collective enactment of a starkly polarized political imaginary: one that, populated by discordant
representations of righteous selves and evil foes, played an important role in triggering state
violence.
More specifically, this article engages recent sociological analyses of social dramas as
collective enactments of crisis and resolution as well as geographic debates on the resistive
spatialities created by protest movements—an approach which it complements by drawing on
current anthropological enquiries into the organizational and performative practices of global
social movements.3 However, while much of the anthropological and geographic literature on
social movements focuses exclusively on the strategies enacted respectively by the protesters and
by those seeking to police them, here I highlight the existence of yet another public, though one
that was largely excluded from the event: that of Genoa’s own residents whose urban everyday
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was forcefully interrupted through the creation of a highly contested, though ephemeral,
spatiality invested with antagonistic political worldviews.
Political imaginaries are culturally negotiated landscapes of power in which a “people”—
that is, a collectivity sharing an enemy--entitles a sovereign agency to wage war in its name.4 As
they legitimize sovereign power, such Manichaean narrative schemata5 feed social dramas as
public enactments of conflict and resolution.6 I argue that the drama that took place in Genoa
was precipitated by the inscription of a political imaginary into a peculiar spatiality: a magic
circle where the elimination of normal social life and the spectacularization and militarization of
political action enabled the performance of an “act apart”7 of epic proportions. As, on one hand,
the Italian police and the army took it upon themselves to protect the free world from its
communist, anarchist, and Al-Qaeda-inspired enemies, on the other hand, the social movements
lashed out at the symbols of global oppression and exploitation. The epochal clash that ensued
took place in the name of the “people” whose rights and freedom had to be protected.

A Spectacle for What Publics?
In the story I am about to tell, the “people” were in the first place the highly abstract
signifier that emerged from the interpellations issued by Italy’s media, the majority of which
were (and still are at the time of writing) controlled by conservative leader and Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi. An important condition for the hailing of such a “people,” I suggest, was the
almost complete erasure of those other populations who did not fit this abstract, hypothetical
mold—Genoa’s own residents in the first place.
The summit had been designed as a global spectacle to be watched on television rather
than seen in person; its imperial placelessness was to be enforced through the threat of violence
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as well as through aesthetic intensification.8 Being particularly concerned with the performative
aspects of the first world summit he would ever host, newly-elected conservative Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi took charge of even the most minute visual details of downtown Genoa. After
all, this is where he would get his first chance ever to be immortalized next to the like of George
W. Bush and Vladimir Putin.
As a seasoned media tycoon, Berlusconi could not help fretting over a beautiful city that
was seemingly not beautiful enough. He had flowerpots re-arranged, ordered that lemons be
hung from non-citrus trees, and had unsightly buildings covered with trompe l’oeil sheets
featuring baroque façades.9 His beautification measures included, among others, an embargo on
drying laundry on window lines. Even as it drew much ridicule, this bizarre imposition became
indicative of the intent to exclude Genoa’s residents from the event: implicitly redefined as
“matter out of place”10 that should not be seen, citizens’ everyday life was not an acceptable
background to the summit.11 By the same token, Genoa’s residents were not an intended public
of observers, either.
Little did it matter that the renovation of Genoa’s downtown had been presented as a gift
to the city and its residents: the Genoese would have to wait to enjoy the restored buildings and
the freshly paved pedestrian areas.12 Far from being exclusively symbolic, their exclusion was
operated through fear. “Genoese, in the weekend from July 20th through the 22nd, if you are not
on vacation yet and if you have a chance to, go to the beach or the countryside”--this was the
message issued by Achille Vinci Giacchi, the ad hoc minister for the G8 summit, in order to
encourage Genoa’s residents to vacate the city.13 In the meantime, the militarized citadel that was
being built right at the heart of the city made it obvious that the latter was to become unlivable
for whomever resided or worked in that area. As the barriers were being erected, police officers
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went from door to door, issuing passes and informing residents that they were expecting riots
and, potentially, even terrorist attacks. Leaving the city, thus went the message, would be the
most reasonable choice in view of the summit.
Many Genoese heeded the recommendation. By the time the event began, at least one
third of approximately 600,000 inhabitants had left.14 Others sought to use their sense of humor
to lighten up what was becoming an unbearably tense atmosphere in a city that was no longer
their own. In this vein, a group of unionists residing in the downtown historic district tried to
drag a mock Trojan horse through a gate, reciting poems to stone-faced police officers who, as
one activist told me later on, “didn’t find it funny.” The presage of state violence inscribed unto
the militarized cityscape—the metal fences, the massive presence of the army and the police, the
sight of snipers on rooftops—was compounded by the worrisome news seeping in about the
alleged plans of antagonistic social movements that were expected to ravage the city. This is how
the owner of a small business in Genoa’s historic district described his feelings at that time:
On one hand, we saw the rising threat of state violence; on the other, we were being told
that the city would be invaded by deviant youth (spostati) keen on destroying everything.
Dismayed at the realization that the very same event that was supposed to promote the
city on a global scale had turned ominous, he decided to close and barricade his shop for the
duration of the summit. Many of his fellow business owners did the same. As an increasingly
deserted Genoa took on the feel of a ghost city, some of those residents who had not left made a
point of participating in the protests--at least until they figured out that it was not safe to be in the
street. As one man told me,
I went with my wife to the migrants’ march [corteo dei migranti]; initially the
atmosphere was festive, and there were a lot of people with their children….
However…the police in anti-riot gear looked scary. I saw them, and then I saw some of
those [anarchist] kids dressed in black with their somber faces... I figured that, if anything
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had happened, we could have been easily trapped between the two groups. Then I told my
wife: let’s go home, I don’t like it here. And I was right.

Like many others, he eventually opted for following the summit from his own home,
monitoring the events from his windows whenever he could, but mostly through television.15
Many fellow Genoese did the same. As they lost the right to their own city—to inhabit, use, and
experience it as they pleased16--the Genoese who withdrew to their homes had to join the
summit’s global audiences of television viewers. They, too, became yet another atomized public
in a public sphere that had been engineered as a consensus-making machine.17 If the suspension
of normal social life contributed to the onset of liminality in downtown Genoa, the justification
for a state of exception whereby fear legitimized sovereign violence18 was provided by the
narratives of danger that had engulfed the Italian public sphere.

Figure 1: Who is out of place? A resident walks her dog while, on the background, the
police prepare to attack the demonstrators. (Photo by Federico Figari)
6

Conjuring the Terrorist Enemy
Even as many of Genoa’s residents had been persuaded to vacate their city, a multitude of
social movements grouped under the umbrella of the Genoa Social Forum flocked to it for the
sake of holding a countersummit. Their goal was to publicly question and challenge the purposes
and modalities of the summit while proposing an alternative model of globalization: “another
world is possible,” was their slogan. The Genoa Social Forum (GSF) was comprised of a variety
of movements ranging from environmentalists to feminists, from Catholics and unionists to
indigenous groups, and from Gypsies and migrants to anti-IMF activists.19 Regardless of their
heterogeneity, though, what the GSF-affiliated movements had in common was their critique of
forms of oppression and exploitation imposed by dominating powers.20 The multifarious ideals
and purposes of the over 200,000 GSF affiliates who convened for the countersummit were thus
summarized in an open letter to Genoa’s citizens:
…actions of international cooperation, environmental protection, valorization of
citizenship and labor rights, the promotion of ethical and responsible economic models,
development of forms of multi-ethnic coexistence and of intercultural exchange,
affirmation of the principles of peace and struggle against injustice. 21

The overwhelming majority of social movements also shared peaceful intentions and
non-violent strategies. A few of those who planned on participating in the countersummit,
however, had pledged to carry out violent attacks in order to express their rejection of global
capitalism. Prior to the summit, these groups obtained a disproportionate attention in the Italian
public sphere.
In the weeks preceding the event, the Italian media had launched a fear campaign22 that
sought to inscribe and congeal a specific narrative of the GSF as the enemy of western
civilization.23 Conservative newspapers owned by, or aligned with, Berlusconi and his allies
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published daily reports on how the GSF movements were going to ravage the city and carry out
indiscriminate attacks on civilians and police officers alike. The protesters would allegedly be
armed with balloons filled with HIV-positive blood. They would also fling marbles full of a
disfiguring acid; the most benign among them would use catapults to throw dung,24 and marginal
youth groups such as the punkabbestia would unleash their pitbulls against the police.25 As if this
were not enough, rumors circulated about a possible Al-Qaeda attack. Osama Bin Laden himself
was supposedly planning on instigating riots among the protesters in order to distract the police
and the army while his drones and scuba-divers would annihilate the leaders of the free world.26
Concerned with the potential of extremist violence, even much of the moderate Italian
left led by the Democratici di Sinistra party distanced itself from the GSF.27 This failure to
provide a public counternarrative in the mainstream media allowed conservative television
channels and newspapers to shape and control the climate of growing anxiety. Little did it matter
that the crowd of protesters spanned a highly heterogeneous multitude. Pacifists, human rights
activists, migrants, environmentalists, feminists, and many other declaredly peaceful groups were
all subsumed under the generic, and generically threatening, label of “no-global:” a somewhat
English-sounding sobriquet that not only simplistically homogenized them as antagonists to
globalization, but also marked them as alien to local culture and society.28 As such stark
dichotomy of just selves and evil others became inscribed unto Genoa’s physical territory, the
tension was bound to escalate.

The Map is the Territory
The officialdom’s preemptive defense against the threat allegedly posited by the
protesters had been the rearrangement of the area of the summit into a highly defendable citadel.
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In the days that preceded the summit, Genoa’s airport, its railway system, and the port were
sealed off, and 2,000 people were turned down at the Italian border.29 Following a strategy that
had been implemented in Quebec City during the Free Trade Area of the Americas summit of
April 2001,30 much of the city center was turned into a red zone (zona rossa) meant to protect the
sacred ground of legitimate power. This area was surrounded by a metal fence (and, in some
cases, heaps of containers) that isolated the area of the summit and prevented any face-to-face
engagement between the G8 leaders and the movements. Around the militarized red zone was
yet another ring—a yellow zone (zona gialla) that included the remainder of the city center as
well as adjacent residential neighborhoods.31 Inside the yellow zone, social movements had been
assigned thematic plazas (piazze tematiche): spaces for representation32 where they could not
only hold their meetings but also performatively manifest their goals and express their critiques
of dominant powers by directly addressing global publics instead of political referents.33 As
performative counterpoints to the theatricality of the summit, their banners, symbols, chants,
music, and costumes sought to convey complex messages to their global publics.34 By the same
token, their carnivalesque antics criticized and mocked an ostensibly self-absorbed and selfreferential establishment intent on discussing world poverty even as it played a major role in its
perpetuation.35 Commenting on the resistive quality of GSF practices in the yellow zone, one
activist remarked:
There were two different cities. In [the yellow zone] there was an outdoor university with
economists, pacifist, people like Rigoberta Menchù talking with the youth from other
countries. On the other hand there was the police that kept pouring in, and the huge
fences that created the ghetto of the powerful.

For the protesters, the hierarchical separation between the red and the yellow zone
constituted a ready-made physical and metaphoric terrain of resistance that lent itself to the
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spatialization of dissent.36 By the same token, however, the protesters were also painfully aware
of how they were being kept in their place, both spatially and metaphorically.37 In the words of a
Ya Basta affiliate, the fence separating the red from the yellow zone was a material reminder of
the “enormous wall” symbolizing the global conflict between the North and the South of the
world:
Just as the symbol of the third world war was the Berlin wall, the symbol of [this war] is
the enormous wall that starts at the Rio Grande and runs through to Turkey, passing
Gibraltar and then north, leaving out Eastern Europe; it divides Australia and Japan from
the rest of East Asia. This wall is an insult to humanity.38
The fence, in this perspective, provided the ultimate evidence of how global political and
financial elites sought to avoid a dialogue with the people they claimed to represent. Confined to
the exterior of the citadel, the “people”, in this view, were excluded from the process of making
decisions that would impact them all. What many protesters had contemptuously dubbed “the
cage” (la gabbia) symbolically reproduced the separation between the rich and the poor, the
powerful and the dispossessed—or, as one activist put it, “the New World Order, the Global
Empire, protected by 20,000 police and military, besieged by the new Global protest
movement.”39 Signs displayed by the movements read: “8 stronzi in gabbia” (“eight shits in a
cage”), “zona rossa di vergogna” (“the zone is red with shame”), “strada chiusa: muro della
vergogna” (“dead-end road: wall of shame”).40 The fence effectively collapsed the global scale
of inequality into a very tangible, very local, and very sizeable symbol: one that posited an
irresistible instigation to be torn down.
In her analysis of the spatial politics of standoffs, sociologist Robin Wagner Pacifici41
observed how, as state representatives and anti-establishment groups confront each other, their
moral and ideological polarization is reinscribed—and exacerbated--through the physical
boundaries that surround the central point of containment. Almost inevitably, such a binary
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organization of space increases tension and leads to violence. On a similar note, I suggest that, by
designing and building the fence, the Italian government did not just prospect and seek to stave
off a violation attempt; it invited it. Prying open the red zone, even though only symbolically,
became a categorical imperative42 for the protesters: one that was matched only by the army and
the police officers’ determination to prevent any trespassing. To them, too, the fence was the
boundary where the enemy began to manifest.
Some movements purported to trespass the fence only symbolically, for example by
throwing flowers and balloons over it. Others braved the mace cannons to pin messages to its
meshes, thus seeking to draw attention to that very same reciprocal acknowledgement and
dialogic communication with political leaders that had been denied to them. Occupying the
ambiguous space between the declaredly non-violent movements and the extremist fringes, the
White Overalls (Tute Bianche) affiliated with Ya Basta,43 instead, decided to try and physically
violate the fence. A few weeks before the summit, their leader Luca Casarini added fuel to the
fire by publicly declaring war to the G8 summit: “we shall block the G8 summit,” he declared to
the Italian media.44 And yet, the White Overalls’ agenda was not quite as explicitly violent. Their
strategy was characterized by a Gandhi-inspired passive resistance45—with the caveat that, even
as they professed restraint from proactively violent attacks, the White Overalls purported to use
the weight of their mass to tear down the red zone barrier.46 In the words of one member,
The aim was to shut down the G8. The strategy was to attempt to breach the fortifications
from a variety of positions. The tactics were direct action. The first task was to break
through the myriad fortified police lines.47
Like Gandhi’s freedom fighters, however, the White Overalls also sought to expose
themselves to police brutality in order to show the world the true colors of an essentially
repressive state.48 On July 20, movement members hosted in the Carlini stadium prepared for
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their march by taping Styrofoam sheets and empty plastic bottles to their bodies: while
symbolizing the waste produced by consumer capitalism,49 these items were also meant to
protect them from police attacks. Hiding behind Plexiglas shields, the White Overalls set out for
the fence. They never made it. Riot police and carabineri corps attacked them when they were
still in the yellow zone, about a mile away from the red zone fence:50
First a frantic barrage of tear-gas, lobbing over the front lines, deep into the heart of the
demonstration. Nobody here had gas masks. The poisonous gas first blinds you, then
hurts, and then disorientates you. It is immediate and devastating. The people, packed in
tightly, panicked and surged backwards. The chaos was manic.51

Armed with the highly toxic CS tear gas that had been banned by the 1997 Chemical
Weapons Convention as well as with the T-shaped tonfa batons known to produce deep
wounds,52 the police pushed the protesters against a wall. The protesters fought back, and
mayhem ensued. By that evening, hundreds of civilians lay injured in local hospitals, or detained
in police stations and army barracks. One of them, Carlo Giuliani, was dead, shot in the head by
a young carabiniere conscript under circumstances that were never fully clarified.53

The Black Bloc: Liminal and Elusive
The police attack had taken place in a yellow zone area for which the White Overalls’
march had been authorized;54 the alleged trigger had been an incursion by Black Bloc anarchists.
Long before the summit, the Black Bloc had been singled out as a major security concern. Their
participation at the 1999 World Trade Organization summit in Seattle, the 2000 International
Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting in Prague, and the 2001 summit of the Americas in
Quebec had been characterized by a high level of devastation.55 Due to their declaredly violent
intent, the Black Bloc were feared not just by the Italian defense apparatus, but also by the
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majority of GSF movements who were concerned about the effects that their violence could have
on their own efforts to promote their cause. As expected, the Black Bloc wreaked havoc in
Genoa, too—and other protesters ended up paying the price for it.56
In what follows, I suggest that the Black Bloc played the role of mythological tricksters
who, positioned betwixt and between, simultaneously violate and establish boundaries.57
Frequently described as cunning deceivers and liars, tricksters are ambiguous and polyvalent.58
Most importantly, they are shape-shifters, situation-invertors, and metaplayers who break the
rules only to reaffirm them.59 Just like the tricksters of world mythology, the Black Bloc who
took part in the 2001 G8 countersummit used shape-shifting, chaos, and ambiguity to help
crystallize representations of the terrorist enemy, thus escalating a repression they invariably
eluded.
Surprisingly enough, the Black Bloc’ participation in Genoa’s countersummit was
characterized by their lack of interest in the very same fence that had monopolized everybody
else’s attention.60 Instead of targeting the red zone, the Black Bloc made quick, unexpected
appearances in the yellow zone, where they carried out violent attacks against what they
described as the symbols of global capitalism. Their objectives supposedly included the
destruction of luxury vehicles, banks, chain stores, car dealerships, and the city jail; however,
apartment complexes, small shops, and cheap cars were also hit in the process.61 Black bloc
targets included journalists, photographers, and—although from a safe distance--army and police
officers.62 In the words of one of them,
firstly the Black Bloc did a lot of property damage, some of it sensible: banks, porn
shops, petrol stations, expensive cars, supermarkets; some of it stupid: traffic lights, bus
shelters, cheaper cars; and some of it lunatic: starting a fire in an office above which was
an apartment bloc.63
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Whenever they launched an attack, the Black Bloc donned their peculiar attire: black
clothes, hoods, and surgical or gas masks. On occasions, they also enacted a ceremony of their
own, waving black flags and marching in circles to the sound of their drums before leashing out
at their targets. This visibility, however, was carefully restricted in time and space. The Black
Bloc always materialized out of nowhere, and left behind no evidence. They disappeared
immediately after their attacks, either by dispersing through Genoa’s maze of shortcuts or by
changing clothes and blending in with the crowds. Even their weapons were improvised out of
materials that were quickly harnessed and just as swiftly discarded. The stones they hurled at the
police were ripped from flowerbeds, and their Molotov cocktails were concocted out of bottles
picked from recycling bins and filled with gas removed from parked vehicles. Masters of
elusiveness, the Black Bloc met attempts to photograph or film their raids with violent attacks,
during which cameras and camcorders were routinely destroyed.

Figure 2: Black Bloc immortalized during an attack threaten the photographer. (Photo by
Anonymous).
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Best described as a tactic of urban guerrilla warfare rather than a movement,64 the Black
Bloc groups roaming Genoa’s yellow zone were open to anyone willing to wear black clothes
and join them in their attacks. Through their masks, the Black Bloc sought to deny the existence
of subjectivities for the sake of becoming, as Avery-Natale put it, an undetermined “anything.”65
By the same token, however, donning a black mask allowed anyone to become a Black Bloc.
Interviewed by a journalist, for example, a man acting as part of a Black Bloc group selfidentified as a British Nazi, and declared: “I don’t give a dime about the G8… I am here to
wreak havoc and I am having a hell of a good time.”66 The uncertainties about the Black Bloc’s
political affiliation also contributed to raising questions about the real purposes of their attacks.
This was all the more the case since the latter took on the same modality again and again: after
positioning themselves in front of a group of non-violent protesters, the Black Bloc would lash
out at the police, pelting them with stones and Molotov cocktails. Then, the police would
attack—but never before the Black Bloc had vanished into thin air.67 Each time, peaceful
protesters were left to bear the brunt of the repression: the blows, the tear gas, and the arbitrary
arrests which the Black Bloc invariably escaped.

Figure 3: After positioning themselves to the front of the protest, the Black Bloc attack the
police. They will vanish before the police retaliate. (Photo by Anonymous)
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Along with their elusiveness, the organizational fluidity of the Black Bloc68 and their lack
of a consistent, and consistently identifiable, public persona gave way to competing readings of
their strategies and real identities. For the police and the military who had been bombarded with
warnings about the terrorist threat, the Black Bloc were the proof that all GSF movements were
essentially violent, and that, as such, all of them had to be repressed by using all means
available.69 Many GSF members, instead, were irked by the police officers’ lack of
responsiveness to the Black Bloc. Eyewitness reports but also films and photographs proved how
the police consistently failed to contain the Black Bloc, targeting peaceful protesters in their
stead. Black Bloc were also spotted and even photographed as they socialized on the roof of a
carabinieri barrack.70 Others were seen as they filmed journalists and reporters at a check point;
interacted collegially with carabinieri and police officers, and walked freely in and out of police
precincts and army barracks, carrying guns under their black clothes.71 The suspicion thus arose
that Black Bloc had been infiltrated by police officers keen on delegitimizing dissent and
providing an alibi for state repression.72
While answering the question of the Black Bloc’s real identity is beyond the scope of this
paper, here I wish to highlight their pivotal contribution to precipitating the drama of just selves
and terrorist others inscribed unto the G8 summit. By holding a revolving mirror to the political
fantasies of all parties involved, and, most importantly, by exacerbating the fear of an elusive, if
dangerous, enemy, the Black Bloc enabled the sovereign violence that was exercised through
police retaliations.73 Tricksters, as has been observed, are made sacred by their violations; in
turn, this sacredness separates them from society and puts them in the condition of those who can
be killed with impunity.74 Just like mythological tricksters, however, the Black Bloc also held the
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ability to divert the consequences of their actions unto others;75 hence, their sacredness was
transferred to the other protesters, who consistently paid the price for the Black Bloc’s raids.

Spaces of Death
The disruptive ambiguity that the Black Bloc injected into the battle of Genoa contributed
to the creation of sinister liminalities: “spaces of death in the land of the living”76 where illegally
detained GSF affiliates were stripped of their rights and subjected to a brutal repression, even as
fellow activists, lawyers, and families were prevented from intervening.77 In a plot that kept
repeating itself throughout the duration of the summit, the alleged presence of the Black Bloc
provided the pretext for the violent police incursion in the Diaz school that hosted the Indymedia
center as well as several GSF members and journalists. On July 21, at about 11pm, a police
commando irrupted into the school. Unidentifiable because of their anti-riot gear,78 the police
officers who broke into the Diaz school that night beat up and severely injured 62 out of the 93
journalists and GSF members who were staying there. The police reportedly walked around the
rooms screaming “where is Carlo? [Giuliani, who had been killed earlier that day]” and savagely
attacking people still in their sleeping bags. By the time they were done, the rooms of the Diaz
school were splattered with blood, and 62 people had deep wounds and fractured bones.79
During the incursion, a crowd amassed in front of the school: concerned GSF members,
physicians and nurses, journalists, and even politicians, none of whom was allowed to enter the
premises as the massacre went on.80 All they got to see was the bleeding bodies of the wounded
who were carried away, to be taken into custody. As legality was restored few days later, Italian
magistrates cleared all of the apprehended: none of them, they found, was a Black Bloc. The two
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Molotov cocktails that were exhibited as evidence turned out to have been planted by an officer
during the raid.
The plight of many of the Diaz school victims did not end with their arrest, though. 75 of
them were taken to the Bolzaneto barracks. Along with the other detainees, they were to be
subjected to physical and psychological abuses in an environment where legality had been
suspended. Jailers would confiscate or even rip prisoners’ identity documents as they told them
“See? Here you are nobody, you have no rights.”81 One detainee reported: “I requested a lawyer,
and all I got was more blows.”82 Reduced to bare life that can be disposed of with impunity,83 the
detainees were deprived of sleep, water, and food, and were not permitted to use the restrooms.
Many prisoners, regardless of their injuries, were forced to lean against walls as they stood on
their toes, their arms eagle-spread, for hours on end:
those who showed signs of weakness and let their arms down were invariably slapped on
their neck, kicked on their feet or shins, punched on their belly or hips…. As to myself, I
was in that position… for about 15 hours.84
Signs of perceived deviance were forcefully removed from bodies: piercings were ripped
away, and long hair was summarily shaven. Earlier on, the protesters’ colorful clothes, costumes,
and hippie garbs had mocked the dark uniforms of the police as well as the black suits of
politicians;85 their upbeat music and improvised dances had challenged army discipline and the
stiff formality of the officialdom. In the Bolzaneto barracks, however, the same unruly bodies
that had made fun of the establishment were punished through degradation and violence. Women
were molested and threatened with rape; prisoners were made to walk through two rows of
soldiers who spat and urinated on them.86 Often, the blows were administered on existing
wounds, so that the victims’ bodies would bear no additional evidence.87 Even such distortion of
the concern with legality was not consistent, though. At times, the viciousness of the abuses
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betrayed a bold confidence in the victimizers’ impunity: as one prisoner reported, “all of a
sudden, a policeman…. took my hand, spread my fingers apart and pulled them violently, thus
tearing my flesh and splitting my hand.”88
The space of exception that had emerged inside the barracks—one whereby state powers
dealt with the threat of terrorism by suspending legality in the name of the law89--dissolved with
the end of the summit, when prisoners were eventually released. The injuries, however, persisted.
Their signs scarred the violated bodies of the victims; they also lingered in the collective psyche
of those publics who still grappled to come to terms with the events.90 In the aftermath of the
battle of Genoa, much was said and written about the seemingly inexplicable brutality of police
and army corps. Persistent rumors surmised that Gianfranco Fini, Vice President of the Council
of Ministers and leader of the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale party, had taken a trip to Genoa
during the summit. A Genoese woman who watched the events from the safety of her home told
me:
I see a motorcade enter the barracks, and shortly after that I hear this loud chanting and
applauses, so many applauses. Then, the following day I hear that Fini was in town. It
must have been him, he came here to incite the violence [metterli su]. Who knows what
he promised them.

On the other hand, apologetic explanations for police brutality singled out the
conspicuous presence of inexperienced young conscripts along with that of corps that had never
been trained in peaceful crowd control methods and only worked with dangerous detainees; such
tenuous circumstances were further compounded by the lack of non-lethal weapons in police and
army equipment.91 On a deeper level, however, the repression of dissent at the 2001 G8 summit shed light on
the extent to which the military machinery activated by the government was, in fact, a self-
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standing political player capable of embodying and performing its own version of the state:92 one
that owed less to utilitarian rationalism than to a highly abstract Manichaean worldview.93 As
this political imaginary was being called forth, it became appropriate for soldiers and police
officers to chant hymns to Mussolini and Pinochet as they abused their victims, often even
forcing them to sing along.94 A fantasy was at work that not only exceeded functional rationality,
but also activated a sedimented fascist repertoire: a root paradigm of “symbols, archetypal
characters, and rhetorical appeals” that is still known to haunt the conservative Italian
imaginary.95 As soldiers and police officers inscribed their discursive, yet absolute Other
(communist, anarchist, terrorist, queer, hippie, etc.) unto the humiliated and brutalized bodies of
their detainees,96 their personal enactment of the dominant narrative became thicker, more
intimate, and also more extreme. It became a rapt, and deadly serious, deep play where
everything was at stake,97 and whose bloodbath was simultaneously highly symbolic and very
real.
By then, captive GSF members had become anonymous blank screens unto which a
dangerous alterity could not only be projected, but also punished by means of the same brutality
that had been imputed to it.98 Given the enormity of these Others’ imaginary crimes, their
retribution could reach above and beyond legality. Thus, in the magic circles drawn around the
Bolzaneto barracks and the Diaz school, the summit that had begun as a ceremony meant to
illustrate and celebrate the global world order turned into a ritual of elimination of the chaotic
Other.99 Blending the mode of the “world as if”100 with that of real actions with tangible
consequences, the sovereign violence applied to the defeated bodies of the protesters enacted the
pretense of an epochal victory over its absolute, if multifarious, enemy. The fiction of this
victory, however, did not outlast the end of the heterotopic spatiality101 that had been created for
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the summit. As soon as the summit reached its conclusion on July 22nd, the magic circle of the
Bolzaneto barracks was lifted, too. This is when the spell broke, and news about the abuses
committed during the summit erupted in the global media.

The End of the Drama
While Italy’s conservative television channels and newspapers had had a considerable
impact in framing the anti-G8 protests for the public opinion before and during the event,102
theirs was not the only gaze on the G8 events. The summit was characterized by an intense
participation not only of international journalists, but also of independent and amateur reporters
and photographers who generated an alternative flow of information. Following Indymedia’s
advice “don’t hate the media, become the media,” hundreds of protesters armed with camcorders
and cameras produced a mass of evidence of police and army brutality, thus assembling a
counternarrative that challenged the official version of the events.103
Once they flooded the media, the images of bruised, lacerated bodies, and the myriad
reports of police repression, torture and violence generated a global spectacle of horror that cast a
deep shade on the G8 summit as well as Italy’s conservative government. In the aftermaths of the
summit, the public confidence in the police and carabinieri corps reached its lowest levels ever.
As one Genoese woman told me, “the presence of the police used to make me feel safe. Now
when I walk by them I get nervous.” Formal investigations began of the abuses of the Diaz
school and the Bolzaneto barracks, followed by first- and second-degree trials that often failed to
give the victims the closure they expected. 104
The loss of trust in the Italian state was just as stark on a global level. If the official
narrative of the government had posited the need to defend western civilization, globally
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circulating tales of a repression that was unheard of for a European Union country opened up a
crevice in Italy’s claims to the status of western democracy. After the events of the Diaz school,
even conservative media around the world began condemning the brutality of the repression;105
furthermore, that such violence had taken place in twenty-first century Europe made things even
worse. Leading European and US newspapers called Italy a “Chilean,” “Argentine,” “East
European,” or “Cuban” dictatorship,106 thus activating a transnational imaginary whereby the
Italian state’s attempt to confirm its membership in an ideal western civilization had produced
the opposite result. As it became clear that the violence that had been initially imputed to the
social movements had, in fact, been committed by representatives of the Italian state, what had
been regarded as the solution to the terrorist problem was singled out as the problem itself. In the
weeks that followed the end of the summit, Silvio Berlusconi’s legitimacy as a G8 leader and as
Italy’s Prime Minister became the object of intense, and intensely critical, debates, both at home
and abroad. For much of the summer, Berlusconi’s government seemed to be heading for a quick
demise. All of a sudden, however, a highly dramatic event took place that provided a formidable
validation for Italy’s conservative government, its fear campaigns, and its violent repression of
protesters.
On September 11, 2001, two hijacked airplanes rammed into New York’s World Trade
Center, destroying the towers and killing thousands; a third plane hit the Pentagon in Arlington,
Virginia, and a fourth one crashed in Pennsylvania while presumably en route to the White
House. Western civilization was, indeed, under attack. Now that the terrorist enemy had turned
out to be every bit as dangerous as expected, the state of exception became a welcome—and
permanent—necessity.107 As concerned citizens around the western world stockpiled canned
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food and duct tape, the global indignation over the abuses committed in Genoa faded in a
splashing of orange alerts. Berlusconi’s government lasted till the end of its five-year mandate.

Conclusions
Rather than being a merely physical gesture, the act of drawing a magic circle and
assigning meaning to it makes it possible to create a “sphere of activity with a disposition of its
own.”108 By virtue of being “apart together,”109 participants in this circle enter a shared
imaginary world where normality is interrupted.110 In this article, I argued that the tragic events
that transpired from the G8 summit—the guerilla warfare as well as the violent repression—were
at least in part a product of the creation of a sui generis magic circle: one that inscribed an
ideological map unto a cityscape that had been transformed for the occasion. The suspension of
normal social life, the crystallization of official narratives, and above all the creation of a
militarized citadel inside the city were all pivotal to turning a highly abstract and starkly
dichotomic political imaginary into lived experience.
Rather than being an attempt to improve residents’ own lives, the restoration of Genoa’s
built environment prior to the summit was only the first stage of a deadly serious deep play: one
whereby the creation of a peculiar placeless-ness went hand in hand with the need to claim and
defend territories at all costs. What had begun as a constellation of camera-ready vignettes (of
world leaders celebrating themselves, and of GSF movements debating, marching, and
performing in their thematic plazas) thus unfolded into a full-fledged social drama. The stakes
were high for all those involved. What, for the officialdom, was the epochal clash between the
free world and its terrorist enemies, for the protesters epitomized the chasm between humankind
and the agents of global oppression. While these imaginaries differed radically from each other,
they both shared the same Manichaean organization of righteous selves and evil enemies. Hence,
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both the protesters and the state representatives respectively sought to enact their own narrative
even as they recruited each other in the role of the “familiar stranger:” the blank screen for
projections of “predictable but unreasonable, unaccountable, deeply flawed, possibly immoral”
alterity.111
By skillfully blending violence and shape-shifting, the Black Bloc intensified the
polarization, thus contributing to precipitating the events. Not only did their transgressions
enable the Italian state to reclaim its monopoly over violence,112 but they also made it easier for
it to suspend the law in the name of legality.113 Death spaces thus emerged where the terrorist
enemy could be punished or even exorcised, in an exercise in magical thinking whereby
attacking the part became equivalent to vanquishing the whole.
After the end of the summit, as normality was reinstated, the realization of the brutality of
the repression sent shock waves through the very same western world whose defense had
supposedly been at stake. Only a few weeks later, however, the lingering indignation was
upstaged by the 9/11 attacks. What followed was a decade of grappling with enemies who were
sometimes real, and often imaginary. The battle of Genoa had been but a dress rehearsal;
eventually, the magic circle had gone global.
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To some extent, the placelessness imposed unto Genoa by the Italian state was mirrored by the degree of
abstraction that this city took on in the collective imaginary of global social movements. In post-2001 resistive
narratives, “Genoa” frequently became a time/space coordinate fully defined by state repression (see for example
Juris Networking Futures: 194; 169). Many of the Genoese I interviewed, however, take exception at this
categorization. Not only do they resist the reduction of the spaces of their everyday life to a theater of brutality, but
they also find that such a designation complies with the conservative government’s intent to mar Genoa’s image as a
traditionally left-wing city. As one man put it:
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sinistra].
While more research is needed on this topic, the ethnographic component of this article is meant to
acknowledge those publics who, living in locations that become theaters of highly divisive events, feel stifled by
how dominant and resistive narratives coalesce in defining their cities.
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